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J. E. Stiglitz
First of all, let me thank the Monte dei Paschi Bank and Giovanni Ferri for
helping to organize this conference. When I was approached with the idea of
having this conference, the main reason I responded with great enthusiasm was
that while there have been many discussions on the East Asian crisis ± the
number of conferences has probably increased supra-exponentially ± the fact
is that there have been relatively few serious academic conferences looking at
the analytic issues that need to be addressed.
The East Asian crisis certainly raised a large number of issues for the
economics profession. In terms of its consequences for the countries involved,
it is certainly the most important event since the Great Depression. Therefore,
if we consider it as an experiment ± not an experiment without obviously
enormous costs to the people involved ± it is an experiment that is producing
an enormous amount of data, raising an enormous number of questions, among
which is the issue of the Global Financial Architecture. Alas, a huge number
of conferences have focused mostly on theoretical issues and empirical
evidence has often been either lacking or de®cient. That is why I thought this
conference, trying to focus on both theoretical and empirical issues, was
potentially so important.
It is easy to notice that, as the crisis occurred and as the policy responses
to the crisis were formulated, many statements were made, often with remark-
able con®dence, which were not based on much research or evidence. Indeed,
there was perhaps almost an inverse correlation between the con®dence with
which the statements were asserted and the support provided to them by
economic theory and evidence. As an example I have been involved in a
couple of debates: one regards the assertion that we need to increase interest
rates to stabilize the exchange rate; the other regards the assertion that
devaluation would hurt the economy more than a rise in interest rates. In the
®rst debate, there was enormous belief or faith that an increase in the interest
rate would stabilize the exchange rate. As the experiment turned out, it did not
work at all. What was particularly interesting was that theory and evidence
available at the time both suggested that the belief was wrong, and yet, those
policies based on wrong belief were pursued. My second example regards a
very strong assertion made by some people, that devaluation would hurt the
economy more than a rise in interest rate. Again, that question is subject to the
validation of both economic theory and empirical evidence and, again, asser-
Economic Notes by Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 28, no. 3-1999, pp. 249±254
# Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, 1999. Published by Blackwell Publishers,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
tions were made with very little evidence. As events turned out and as the
studies subsequently have shown, the assertions that were made, at least by a
number of parties, were wrong.
At the beginning of the discussions on the East Asian crisis, many
explanations were put forward as to why the crisis occurred: issues like
transparency and chrony capitalism ranked very high. Again, what is remark-
able is both how rapid the political leaders ± as well newspaper journalists ±
were able to come forward with those explanations before doing very much
research, and how weakly those explanations stood up to the scrutiny of more
detailed analyses. Obviously, that raises the question `Why were those explana-
tions put forward with such alacrity and such conviction when the evidence for
them seemed to be so missing?', and that brings us into the area ± that we
would not bring into this conference, but I think will occupy a lot of people
going forward ± which is that, obviously, there was some special interest that
these kinds of explanations served and one would need to give more attention
to the political economy of both policy and explanations of events. Thus, once
more, it seemed to me that having a conference in which a number of the key
issues raised by the East Asia crisis ± that have to be addressed and have to be
thought about ± would be of enourmous value. Although the set of issues
raised is enormous, this conference will be able to look at only a few of them.
Let me just try to put into perspective three or four of the topics that will be
discussed. Hopefully, the discussions in the next two days will shed some light
on these issues.
The ®rst topic has to do with the prediction of economic crises. One of the
ironies here is that hours, or certainly days, after the crisis, you heard an
outpouring of people saying: `` Of course, the crisis occurred. Look at what was
wrong with the countries. There's chrony capitalism, lack of transparency and
so forth.'' Well, the ®rst question is: `` If it was so obvious, why didn't anybody
predict it?'' In fact, this raises the issue about prediction of crises, a task which
is similar to that of journalists who, after the stock market goes up or down,
have to explain why it went up or down. That is their job, they are paid for it.
On the other hand, had they really had strong prediction powers, they would be
rich; they would not be journalists, because they would have used that
information ex ante to take a position in the market. Thus, to shed light on this
crucial issue, we need to raise a few questions: `` What do our models say about
how likely were these countries to have crises?'' `` Were the crises predictable?''
and `` Is it a question that our models are bad?'' or `` Is there something sui
generis involved in these crises?'' These are clearly very important questions
because, going forward, we would like to be able to predict crises, if we can.
Accordingly, either our models are to be improved or we ought to recognize
some of the unique features that were played in this crisis. On one of those sets
of issues, Jason Furman and I have already written quite a bit, showing that,
for instance, transparency, which is one of the variables that has most
frequently been invoked, is clearly not the cause of the crisis. Let us just recall
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that the last set of crises were in Scandinavia, probably the countries with the
most transparent set of institutions and so, while transparency may have
contributed to the depth of the East Asian crisis, it clearly cannot be ascribed
to as its cause and one can use econometric models to verify that concern. One
of the papers that is going to be presented here argues that, in fact, not only did
the credit rating agencies do a bad job in predicting the crisis, the way they
revised their ratings may have actually caused the crisis to be worse than
otherwise it would have been. So, here we have an outside private sector
agency not only failing to do a good prediction job, but actually being a player
within the crisis and contributing to it. What implications that has for policy, I
think, is something that we will go on to ponder.
The second topic that we need to address is the policy response to the
crisis. There is, by now, widespread agreement that the magnitude of the ®scal
contractions engaged in were excessively contractionary and that they con-
tributed to the magnitude of the downturn. There is, however, remaining
controversy over at least two issues. First, were the monetary policies appro-
priate? This relates to some of the fundamental issues referred to earlier. The
conference will not have time to consider those in much detail, but I hope the
discussion will partially remedy this. The second issue, though, is a more
profound one from the point of view of economic theory and empirical models:
should there have been a better job at forecasting? To put it in the context,
when I was Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, we regularly
monitored a whole range of forecasting models, we brought in all the fore-
casters ± from private and public sector ± for the US economy, looking
forward three months, six months and up to ®ve years. We were very careful in
trying to compare the models to understand the reasons for the difference in
forecasts, their weaknesses, their strengths, their bases, and which prediction
we would have the greatest con®dence in as the basis of our economic
recommendations. I can state with some con®dence that this kind of exercise
of open comparison of models has not been done extensively in the interna-
tional arena. Perhaps, therefore, this has put those involved in making and
formulating advice in a less well-prepared position to formulate policy
recommendations appropriate to the circumstances that prevailed in these
economies. I would go even further and suggest that good economic modelling
should have predicted the severity of the economic downturns facing the East
Asian crisis countries. If that is the case ± and certainly many of us felt that it
was going to be that case ± then, what is wrong with the models that have led
to the wrong kinds of predictions, and what can be done in the future? Indeed,
I believe we should focus mostly on the future, and on what needs to be done,
to avoid similar kinds of mistakes. We will be facing new crises and will have
to make economic decisions, and those economic decisions will have severe
consequences: the magnitude of the recessions and depressions in East Asia
are testimony to a failure of economists of a ®rst order of magnitude.
As a consequence of the severe economic downturn ± partly resulting from
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bad policy formulations ± there has been a plethora of bankruptcies: our third
topic. By some estimates, the number of bankrupt ®rms in Indonesia is some-
where around 75 per cent; in other countries, it is between 30 per cent and 75
per cent. This level of economic disorganization has seldom been seen in the
past. The nature of the problem ± the fact that it was not government debt but
private debt, that raising interest rates to the level that they reached would likely
result, given the high level of corporate leverage, in systemic bankruptcy ±
certainly calls for a different approach to economic policy. Thoughts about
bankruptcy have not played a central role in macroeconomics. Over the past
®fteen or twenty years, an enormous amount of work focusing on the impor-
tance of bankruptcy has been done. Its results have been integrated into
microeconomic models but, unfortunately, not yet into macroeconomic analyses
to the extent that they ought to be. One of the ironies is that, while many of these
East Asian countries worked years to reduce their public debt, suddenly, as a
result of the corporate and ®nancial sector crisis and the governments assuming
these private debts, public debt is once again at very high levels. The idea that
governments having spent ten years privatizing national assets, decided to
nationalize private liabilities seems to me one of the ironies of the recent crisis.
Thus, one of the major issues that this conference is going to address is the view
about this whole set of bankruptcy, corporate reorganization, the effect of
economic policy on default and on corporate disorganization in the manner that
has worked out in East Asia. Let me indulge in just one of the important asides
for which, again, important empirical research has provided evidence. We
normally think of bankruptcy as a mechanism of sorting good from bad ®rms.
However, with this kind of systemic bankruptcy that has occurred, bankruptcy
as a sorting mechanism completely falls apart and you have good ®rms just as
likely to die as bad ®rms. So, the whole impact on the structure of the economy
going forward is completely disrupted.
Finally, a very important topic is bank regulation. One emerging con-
sensus ± although not unanimity ± is that capital market liberalization,
particularly that of short-term ®nancial ¯ows, and excessively rapid ®nancial
market deregulation, without putting in place the appropriate safeguards, are
factors that contributed very signi®cantly to the crisis. In my opinion, this type
of ®nancial liberalization has contributed to the fact that, over the last quarter
of a century, crises ± ®nancial and currency crises ± have become more
frequent and deeper. We now focus on the East Asia crisis, because such a big
event drew a lot of attention but, in fact, if you look at historical records, there
have been between 80 and 100 crises in the 25 years. Thus, these crises are not
isolated events; they are not unique accidents in a road. To me, this is evidence
that something is wrong with the basic ®nancial architecture. Maybe people
make mistakes, but if you have an economic system that is designed in a way
that only perfect race drivers can drive on it safely, then it is not well designed.
Fallible governments and even well-managed governments have faced enorm-
ous problems; this is one of the things that have become very clear after the
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events of August 1998. So, it is now easy to recognize that even good countries
with good economic policies may be very adversely affected, and that capital
market and ®nancial market deregulation done in the wrong way has an
essential part in causing the instability that we have witnessed. It is very
interesting to notice that the evidence on the bene®ts of this capital liberal-
ization has been at best scanty. I began my remarks by talking about statements
made with an enormous amount of con®dence, but very little evidence: this is
a case in point. A few years ago, there was a big initiative to engage in capital
market liberalization and you would have thought, given the conviction with
which that initiative went forward, that there would be a plethora of evidence
and theory, showing beyond the shadow of doubt that such policies would raise
standards of living and improve economic growth, and yet, the level of
evidence on this is very scanty. Perhaps the best study done to date is that by
Dani Rodrik from Harvard, which shows no relationship between capital
liberalization and economic growth. On the contrary, there is a large variety of
literature ± and also econometric studies ± showing that excessive liberal-
ization is systematically related to a higher probability of a crisis. This issue
needs to be studied in depth; this is certainly not the last word that is going to
be said about it. The point I would like to stress once more is that the large role
that ideology, rather than science, has played in policy calls for a burden for
conferences like this to look at the evidence and to engage in the debate on the
real substance of the issue, a little bit set apart from the battles of the political
process. Nevertheless, more fundamentally for the purposes of this conference,
I hope this conference will discuss the following issues in the context of bank
regulation. First, there is a growing recognition that excessive reliance on
capital adequacy standards is neither suf®cient, neither represents an ef®cient
form of regulation, particularly for the less developed countries, which face
greater risk and less capacity for risk management. Second, the way regulation
and resolution of problems were implemented in the advent of the East Asian
crisis probably contributed themselves to exacerbate the depth of the crisis.
This is a very fundamental point which parallels the points made above on
corporate reorganization. I mentioned that, in the context of the East Asian
corporate reorganization, something like 50±75% of the ®rms are bankrupt.
Dealing with bankruptcy on such systemic basis is fundamentally different
from dealing with bankruptcy when only a few ®rms in the economy are
bankrupt. Equivalently here, dealing with a ®nancial system in which 50±75%
of the banks are weak, is fundamentally different from dealing with a banking
system in which only one or two banks are weak. Dealing with systemic
®nancial sector problems is fundamentally different from dealing with isolated
problems. There is a growing recognition of the failure to recognize what
might be called in this context the `fallacy of composition'. That is, when an
isolated bank tries to correct its problems, it may be successful; when a whole
banking system tries to restore its capital adequacy, it may lead to all ®rms
looking even worse as each bank tries to reduce its asset base to meet the BIS
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standards. Intensifying credit constraints further weaken the economy. Thus,
dealing with systemic consequences is the fourth topic that this conference will
deal with.
What I have tried to do in these introductory remarks is to raise questions.
I have also tried to put forward the fundamental hypothesis that, in fact ± be it
in recognizing the causes of the crisis, in predicting the crisis and, most
importantly, in responding to the crisis ± a lack of basic knowledge about
economics and a lack of use of the available knowledge may have contributed
to both the inability to anticipate and to deal with the crisis most effectively.
The purpose of this conference, however, is not to go over the past ± there
have been a lot of debates over that; that is not the function. The function is to
recognize that, as I said before, we will have crises in the future ± no matter
what we do, there will be crises ± and we will have to face the challenge of
how to deal with them. Thus, unless we can answer the kinds of questions that
I have posed above, we will not be able to deal with future crises in the way
which most effectively maintains the strength of these economies. As we move
forward, we must remember that those policies formulated to respond to the
crisis ± if they have not contributed to aggravate it ± have failed to stymie
enormous recessions and/or depressions. Even worse, these policies have
adversely affected, with disproportionate intensity, the workers and the small
businesses who had not engaged in international ®nancial market speculation.
These were innocent by-standers who, in some sense, have borne a huge part
of the brunt of the adjustment, without having themselves enjoyed any of the
fruits of the economic policies that led to the crisis or being party to the
packages to respond to the crisis.
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